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Abstract—We propose a novel approach to establish crypto-
graphic keys among mobile users and a networking infrastruc-
ture. Our approach comes at a low cost and can either be used
as an alternative to existing solutions or can be employed in
a complementary way. Our basic observation is that users are
often very mobile. As they interact with the infrastructure, each
of them leaves a unique trace behind, known both to the users
and the infrastructure. We can leverage this shared information
to create shared secret keys, with little or no change of existing
mobile communication systems. We show that we can achieve
(almost passively) a rate of roughly 0.1 bits per second.
I. INTRODUCTION
A core requirement for future wireless systems is to support
communication for large numbers of mobile users, while
offering security and privacy. As we move from traditional
cellular telephony to more fluid and mobile settings, security
and privacy become increasingly important and difficult to
achieve, especially for highly mobile users.
A basic question is how a roaming device can establish
cryptographic keys in a highly volatile mobile environment.
A standard yet organizationally complex solution (especially
for large-scale multi-domain dynamic systems), a public key
infrastructure (PKI), could address this problem. Present-day
cellular data systems rely on pre-established secrets (SIM
cards) and cross-organizational verification of identity and
authorization (e.g., for billing).
Several alternatively schemes, surveyed in Sec. VI, leverage
the wireless channel variability, so that two nodes in range of
each other utilize reciprocal observation of signals to establish
a shared secret key.
Our work is close in spirit, yet we propose a fundamentally
different approach: to leverage mobility and its inherent ran-
domness as the basis for key generation. Our starting point
is that users are often quite mobile and they interact with
networking infrastructures; in doing so, each of them leaves
behind a unique trace. Many works seek to identify structure
in the mobility of a population, to anticipate user mobility and
offer services. Instead, we exploit the inherent randomness of
each individual mobility trace. For example, the sequence of
base stations a driver’s smart phone connects to and the times
of these encounters constitute shared information between the
user and the infrastructure.
This information allows establishing a shared secret, and
renewing it over time thanks to the user mobility. Having such
a source of secret keys opens a new range of opportunities for
users to address security and privacy needs, complementing
existing techniques. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility
of this novel approach and we shed light on what rates of
secrecy can be achieved. Our main contributions are:
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Figure 1. Bob’s (the mobile’s) itinerary in the area of Alice (the infrastruc-
ture), which operates the four base-stations, A,B,C, and D.
1) A new approach for secret key generation, applicable to
a wide range of systems that involve mobile nodes and a
wireless communication infrastructure. We investigate design
choices and propose a backward-compatible protocol with low
overhead cost for existing cellular systems.
2) The performance evaluation of our scheme, with analytical
modeling. In the analysis, we show that on the one hand,
the scheme can be modeled as a renewal process. On the
other hand, we develop a relation between different sampling
intervals that allows for more efficient evaluation. In addition
to pure simulation, we also use a mobility model, that allows
for efficient evaluation of a wide range of scenarios. We
find that over a sufficiently shot for practical applications
acceptable period of time (comparable to average commute
times for example) a mobile node and an entity on the back-
end of the infrastructure can derive common information,
sufficient for establishing a strong secret shared key; even in
the presence of a strong adversary.
In the remainder of the paper, Sec. II describes the main
idea behind our approach and it introduces basic definitions,
Sec. III presents our scheme, Sec. IV introduces our analytical
model and Sec. V presents the scheme evaluation. Sec. VI
surveys related work before we conclude. In this paper, give a
sketch of the ideas and procedures. For more details, we refer
the reader to the extended version of the paper [1].
II. MAIN IDEA AND SETUP
Currently, mobility is perceived primarily as a hurdle to
overcome in mobile computing systems that need to support
secrecy and secure communication. Our position is that, on the
contrary, mobility can be a source of secrecy and thus enable
security enhancements. Moreover, such enhancements can be
achieved using simple schemes, building on well-established
existing infrastructure. We illustrate our approach assuming a
cellular infrastructure.
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A. Main Idea
Consider a user who enters a geographical area at some time
t0 and drives around until he exits the area at a later time te.
His itinerary can be described by his geographical position
at each time t within the interval of interest, t0 ≤ t ≤ te,
captured by a two-dimensional curve L(t), as depicted in
Fig. 1. Consider this geographical area covered by a cellular
infrastructure, where base stations are labeled. During his
itinerary, the user connects to various base stations. We can
think of the history of connections as a stochastic process
X(t). Assume that we sample this process every δs seconds.
This creates the discrete signalX[i] ￿ X(iδs). We then keep n
samples X[i] in a vector X ￿ [X[0], X[1], . . . ,X[n−1]]. This
vector is what our protocol uses as a shared secret between
the user and the infrastructure.
B. Adversary
In our model, the adversary is a passive1 eavesdropper.
Its presence, e.g. through the deployment of eavesdropping
devices, is assumed bounded, that is, within a part of the entire
area. Assuming an arbitrary non-unique label assignement to
all base stations, we consider an adversary able to intercept
all communication between the user, the infrastructure and
all base stations with the same label, where we assume the
base stations to be labeled randomly with 4 or more different
labels. This defines a particularly strong adversary because,
as we discuss in Secs. IV, V, the adversary can intercept
all messages with an arbitrary precision to 25% of all base
stations. We emphasize that the interception of all messages
constitutes a worst-case scenario and the coverage of 25% of
all base stations implies vast resources for the adversary.
C. Performance Metrics
In order to evaluate the quality of the generated key, we need
to quantify the inherent randomness in the collected vectors
X . If the base stations are assigned labels from a set M of
size m, then we can consider this vector X to be a discrete
random variable that takes mn values.
Our performance metric is the secrecy rate Rs, that quan-
tifies the number of generated random bits per second. In the
presence of an adversary, this quantifies the number of bits,
the adversary has no information about. For traces of length
n, Rs is calculated as
H(X)
nδs
, where H(X) is the entropy
of the vectors X . As n increases, this quantity approaches
H(X)
δs
, where H(X) is the entropy rate. Recall that the entropy
rate is a lower bound of the entropy and takes into account
all dependencies, even those that go beyond the boundary
of the vector [2]. The entropy rate is for our evaluation the
most fundamental measure. Similarly, in the presence of the
1An active adversary is orthogonal to our investigation. Clearly, injection of
arbitrary messages, e.g., by impersonation of a base station, would introduce
errors in our scheme; however, such errors can be detected leading to
aborting the key generation. Moreover, cellular networks or commercial Wi-
Fi infrastructures are well protected and centrally managed; even though
WiFi access point impersonation is perhaps easy, this is much harder for
base stations in cellular systems (used as an example system here), which
significantly raises the bar for an adversary.
adversary A, we use the conditional entropies H(X|A)nδs andH(X|A)
δs
.
III. OUR SCHEME
Our scheme establishes a secret key between two entities:
(i) The infrastructure-side entity, C, any machine (e.g.,
server) that lies on the back side of the wireless infrastructure
(i.e., on the wire-line network). The wireless infrastructure
consists of a set of base stations, {I}, distributed across a
geographical area, connected with wire-line links and nodes,
such as routers and switches. C can access the {I} infrastruc-
ture.
(ii) A mobile node, V , that roams in the geographical
area covered by {I}. V can connect to base stations in {I}
when in range, possibly making use of a semi-reliable data
link protocol to mitigate communication errors. Over time, V
connects to multiple base stations, one at a time.
Each base station is assigned a label from a set M. The
base station labeling can be conveyed by S to V . Multiple
base stations may have the same label.
Trace Collection: To generate a shared key, V and C
need to collect a trace of data on the connectivity of V
with base stations in {I}. The collected samples X[i] =
X(iδs) are stored in what we term the trace vector. X =
[X[0], X[1], . . . X[n − 1]], where n = Tδs and T = te − t0
is the total sampling duration. The samples are retained with
appropriate logging at C and V .
Trace Consolidation: V and C need to consolidate their
traces, i.e., account for any errors in the trace creation, so that
the key extraction is done on the same trace. To reveal minimal
information about XV and XS during consolidation, even in
the presence of an adversary that perfectly intercepts the com-
munication, well-known mechanisms for privacy amplification
can be used [3].
Key Extraction: Finally, S and V use the common infor-
mation, XS (which is identical to XV ), to derive a shared
secret key KV,S . Well known methods as these proposed in
[4], [5] can be used.
Design Parameters: Three basic parameters control the
trace collection:
1) The alphabet size, i.e., the size of the set M, or the
number of distinct labels we assign to the base stations.
2) The sampling interval δs, i.e., how often we sample.
3) The sampling duration T = te − t0, i.e., for how long
we sample.
Parameter choice guidelines: (1) We propose to employ
M of a size equal to the maximum number of neighbors a base
station can have; and a labeling that assigns a different label
to each neighbor. (2) We suggest selecting a sampling interval
of the same order of magnitude as the average sojourn time,
e.g. 14 of the average sojourn time. (3) Finally, the sampling
duration T can be selected sufficiently large to allow extracting
the required number of random bits.
A detailed justification of parameter choices and an example
of infrastructure compatible deployment can be found in [1].
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IV. MODELING AND ANALYSIS
We introduce a model to analyze the scheme performance,
i.e., the quality of the produced key in terms of entropy and
entropy rate (see Sec. II). We use as input only the distribution
of sojourn times, which can be collected experimentally. We
validate our model in Sec. V, showing that the analytic
performance predictions very well agree with our exhaustive
simulation results. Thus, our modeling can significantly sim-
plify the performance analysis of the scheme (i.e., the required
simulations). More important, it helps understand better what
the important parameters for the key generation rate are.
A. Model
Recall that X(t) is the stochastic process describing the
labels of the base station that a user is connected to at
time t, and X = [X[0], X[1], . . . X[n − 1]] is the trace of
length n, and δs is the sampling interval. The process X(t)
is quite complicated, and so is X . We therefore introduce a
model which is analytically tractable but preserves the key
characteristics of X(t).
Let S be the random variable that describes the sojourn time.
For a fixed sampling period δs, we measure the sojourn time in
multiples of δs, i.e., S ∈ N δs. E.g., S = 3δs means that for 3
consecutive sampling times a user is connected to a particular
base station, but that at the 4-th sampling time instance he has
switched. Our model takes as input the distribution of S for a
given parameter δs; this distribution can be calculated through
simulations or modeling.
Definition 1 (Interarrival Times U ): As mentioned above,
S takes values in N δs. Associate to S the integer-valued ran-
dom variable U , where pi = P (U = i) = P (S = iδs), i ≥ 1.
We call U the inter-arrival time.
We now postulate that we can model the connection pro-
cess by a renewal process with inter-arrival times distributed
according to U . With respect to the labels, we assume that
for every new connection the label is chosen uniformly at
random from the label set M. This is a reasonable model if
we assume that we choose a relatively small label set. This is a
reasonable choice because the analysis shows that a significant
source of randomness is contained in the “timing” information.
Further, one would expect that even if we assigned unique
labels to each base station, the amount of randomness does not
significantly increase. This is true because, given the identity
of a base station, we know its location, and for reasonable
sampling intervals δs, the “next” base station will very likely
be one of its nearest neighbors. This number of neighbors is
typically small (perhaps 4) and it is this number and not the
absolute number of base stations which limits the entropy rate.
Given these considerations, we will stick to small label sets.
As a side benefit, this requires less storage and processing.
Definition 2 (Renewal Process R, Label Process Y ):
Let R denote a renewal process with inter-arrival times
distributed according to U . More precisely, let FU (x)
denote the distribution function corresponding to U . Let
GU (x) = 1µp
￿ x
z=0(1 − FU (z))dz. This new distribution
is called remaining sojourn time distribution. Let U1 be
distributed according to GU and let U2, U3, . . . denote
a sequence of independent random variables, distributed
according to FU . Let R0 = 0 and Rn =
￿n
i=1 Ui,
n ≥ 1. Let Y [i] denote our analytical model for X[i]. We
pick Y [Rn], n ≥ 0, uniformly at random from M. For
i ∈ [Rn+1, . . . , Rn+1− 1], we define Y [i] = Y [Rn]. Finally,
define Y as Y ￿ [Y [0], Y [1], . . . Y [n − 1]]. We call Y the
trace.
The reason we selected the distribution of U1 in this particular
way (and different from the distribution of all other Ui) is
that this choice makes the process stationary. In particular, for
i ≥ 0 the process behaves as if the renewal process had started
in the infinite past. This simplifies our analysis.
Definition 3 (Adversary Process): Consider a specific label
mi ∈ M. The stochastic process of the strong adversary is
defined as A ￿ [A[0], A[1], . . . A[n− 1]], with
A[j] =
￿
0, if Y [j] ￿= mi,
1, if Y [j] = mi.
That is, the adversary is present at base stations having label
mi and thus in a fraction 1m of all base stations. The process
A is stationary because it is fully determined by the stationary
process Y .
B. Entropy and Entropy Rate of Y
Lemma 1: Let Y be the label process as given in Def. 2.
For n ≥ 1, limδs→0H(Y ) = −
￿m
i=1
1
m log2m = log2m
and limδs→∞H(Y ) = −
￿mn
i=1
1
mn log2
1
mn = n log2m. For
n = 1, H(Y ) = log2m. For n = 2, H(Y ) = log2(m) −
(µp−1)m+1
µpm
log2(
(µp−1)m+1
µpm
)− m−1µpm log2( 1µpm ).
Finally, the entropy rate H(Y ) is given by
H(Y ) = H({qi}) + log2(m− 1)
µq
,
where q and µq are defined as follows. Define p(x) =￿∞
i=1 pix
i. Let q(x) = p(x) m−1m−p(x) . Let {qi} denote the
corresponding probabilities, i.e., develop q(x) as a Taylor
series around x = 0. Let H({qi}) be the entropy of {qi} and
let µq =
￿
iqi.
Due to space constraints, we refer to [1] for the proof and
continue here with the discussion of the result.
Discussion.We have only given entropy expressions for n =
1 and 2. Although it is possible to derive expressions for larger
n as well, the operationally most significant quantity is the
entropy rate H(Y ). We next discuss how H(Y ) behaves.
For both small or large values of δs we can easily get
accurate simplified expressions for H(Y ). In case of not too
large values of δs, H(Y ) is dominated by the randomness
inherent in the “timing”, i.e., by the term H({qi}). As detailed
in [1], it follows that the entropy rate (per second) has in this
regime the expression a − b log2(δs) (e.g., for the grid map
scenario, that we will introduce in Sec. V, we have a ≈ 0.12
and b ≈ 1/70). This expression implies that the entropy rate
goes to infinity as δs goes to 0. But of course, small δs comes
at the cost of a large overhead; moreover, in every system the
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value of δs is lower bounded by the inherent timing accuracy
we can achieve. For very large values of δs the entropy is
eventually dominated by the term log(m). Further, for large
values of δs, µq converges to 1. Therefore, in this regime the
secrecy rate scales like log(m)/δs.
The adversarial model is discussed in the extended version
[1].
C. Relationship Between Sojourn Time Distributions
We show how to relate the sojourn time distributions of
different sampling rates. This allows us to compute the sojourn
time distribution once and for all and then to choose the
sampling rate at a later point.
We assume that we have a distribution of sojourn times as
described in [1]. For simplicity, we further assume that the
basic underlying process X(t) is discrete. This means that all
switches take place only at multiples of a basic time unit; call
it δ and t ∈ κδ,κ ∈ N, e.g. δ could be a microsecond.
We now make the following distinction. There is the actual
“physical” sojourn time distribution, our reference distribution,
based on this time unit δ. For an actual system, we might
decide for reasons of complexity (including operational system
constraints) to only sample the process every δs time units,
i.e., δs = κδ for some κ ∈ N. We call this new process the
sampled process Xδs and its related distribution, the sampled
distribution. We are interested in the relationship between
these two distributions.
We now define the procedure of sampling the sojourn time
distribution more precisely.
Definition 4 (Sampling of Sojourn Time Distribution ):
Choose a reference process Xδ . We now fix the new sampling
interval δs = κδ. In this case, the sampled process Xδs only
takes values for t ∈ Nδs. Let i be the index of the sample
and Bi the base station, the user was connected to at time
t = iδs. We collect Bi if t ∈ {(i − 1)δs, . . . , iδs − 1}. We
call the sojourn time the time between the first and the last
sample of the same base station. With sampling the sojourn
time distribution, we denote the step from the sojourn time
distribution estimated with δs = δ to the related sojourn time
distribution estimated with δs = κδ.
In order to simplify discussions, we first define our con-
vention for notation of the distribution functions: We use
small letters for the probability distribution function: f(x) =
Pr[X = x] with µf =
￿∞
x=0 xf(x) the mean of the
distribution f . For the cumulative distribution functions, we
use capital letters: F (x) =
￿x
z=−∞ f(z). In the following,
x ∈ {0, 1, . . . }.
Lemma 2 (Analytical Sampling): Let Gδs(x) be the cumu-
lative function for the sampled remaining sojourn times.
Gδs(x) is then given by Gδs(x) = Gδ(δn(x+1)−1), δn = δsδ .
The sampled distribution of inter-arrival times
is given by Fδs(x) = (x + 1) − 1Gδs (0)Gδs(x) −￿x−1
z=0 Fδs(z), with Fδs(0) = 0.
Proof: Gδs(x) is the cumulative distribution of remaining
sojourn times. gδs(x) is the probability that if one chooses
one sample at random, there are still xδn time steps of length
Scenario grid-net map real map
Dimensions 6 ∗ 6km 7 ∗ 8km
Distance between streets 0.3km different
Number of base stations 100 484
Max. speed 17m/s 34m/s
Number of cars per simulation 480 ∗ 30 840 ∗ 30
Entry rate 20 ∗ 4cars/20sec 1400cars/500sec
Table I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
δ until the next switch of base station. This means that for
the following xδn steps, the user will stay in the same base
station and he will have changed before (x+ 1)δn steps. The
event gδs(x) thus includes all events from time step xδn until
time step (x+1)δn−1 and thus gδs(x) =
￿(x+1)δn−1
z=xδn
gδ(z).
We can write Gδs(x) as Gδs(x) =
￿x
z=0 gδs(z). Using
this relation and the definition for the cumulative distribution
function, we obtain that the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the remaining sojourn times equals to Gδs(x) =￿(x+1)δn−1
z=0 gδ(z) = Gδ((x+1)δn−1), which is the first part
of Lem. 2. The second part is simply obtained by inverting the
relation given in Def. 2.
This relation now allows to transforme the distributions from
one sampling interval to another, thus one can easily evaluate
the performance for a range of sampling intervals.
However, at this step, one still needs to simulate the traces
and compute the sojourn time distribution at least once. We
now aim to omit the last nontrivial simulation step and go
towards modeling as presented in Sec. V-C.
V. EVALUATION
A. Methodology
Testing environment: We test the performance of our
protocol considering users in moving cars. We produce data
with the SUMO traffic simulator [6], which generates routes
that mimic natural user behavior via an algorithm called
dynamic user assignment2. In essence, this algorithm finds
the quickest route instead of the shortest path. We consider
two types of topology: the grid map scenario, which uses an
artificial grid net, and the real map scenario, which uses a real
map of Lausanne of equivalent dimensions to the grid map.
The simulated area is covered by square cells of the same
size, each cell served by a base station. Each simulated base
station is randomly assigned one of four different labels; thus,
each label is assigned to roughly 25% of the base stations. Cars
enter and exit this area at a randomly chosen border point. The
precise parameters are listed in Table I.
Adversary: We considered a strong adversary who can
overhear all parts of the trace corresponding to a specific
label3.
2It reflects the idea that traveling involves some time, cost or disutility that
users would prefer to avoid.
3We also considered a weak adversary that only knows the positions in the
trace where the user is connected to one specific base station, but as we found
almost no performance penalty we do not report these results.
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Theoretical model and analysis (Sec. IV) validation:
We empirically calculate the distribution of the sojourn times
using our simulations, and use this distribution as input for our
theoretical model. We then compare the theoretically derived
performance from the model with that of the simulated system.
Entropy computation and a practical challenge: For a
fixed trace length n the entropy can be computed based on
simulations in the following way. Assume we have generated
a collection of vectors X from traces of all users in the
system. This in turn allows us to estimate the probability
distribution on the set of possible outcome vectors. We can
then compute the entropy associated to this probability dis-
tribution. In practice, this approach quickly reaches its limits.
We need to calculate the distribution on the set Mn, which
has cardinality mn. This quickly becomes close to infeasible
or at least impractical as m and n increase, and limits the
scenarios we can examine through simulations. This is where
the theoretical modeling can help.
B. Simulation Results
Fig. 2(a) and (c) show the performance of our protocol as
a function of the sampling interval δs for the case of the grid
map and the real map scenario, respectively. We plot both the
results obtained through simulations (dotted curves) as well
as the results obtained from the theoretical model (continuous
curves). Our simulations provide results for trace lengths n =
2, n = 3, n = 4, n = 6 and n = 8; we see that these results fit
quite well to the curves derived from the theoretical model. We
thus proceed to use the theoretical model to derive the upper
and lower bound curves also depicted in the figure, which
correspond to vector lengths n = 1 and n→∞, respectively.
The latter is derived using the entropy rate, as we discussed
earlier.
As the trace length, n, grows, the curves converge towards
the entropy rate (which, as discussed earlier, gives a lower
bound for any length): we closely approach this curve even for
relatively short lengths, e.g., n = 8. Curves for smaller n seem
to deliver higher secrecy rates. However, this is misleading:
these computations only apply if we collect a set of such
vectors well-separated in time, but they are meaningless if
we sample consecutive vectors, due to the dependence of the
values such vectors take. Thus, the entropy rate gives a more
realistic estimate of the expected performance. E.g., in the grid
map scenario, we expect to collect 128 random bits in approx.
25 minutes, if we sample three times per minute.
Fig. 2(b) shows how the presence of an adversary affects
performance: it reduces the secrecy rate by approx. 40%.
Indeed, by overhearing all communications of 25% of the
base stations, the adversary can deduce a lot more. As an
extreme case, consider the example of m = 2: an adversary
eavesdropping half the system area can in fact reconstruct the
whole trace.
C. Mobility Model for Sojourn Time Distribution
We use a mobility model introduced by [7], that provides
sojourn time distributions for cellular systems in the following
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Figure 3. Entropy rate for (a) average speed of 10 kmh , base station diameter
of 125, 250, 500 and 1000m, (b) base station diameter of 500m, average
speed of 20, 40,60 and 80 kmh .
way: We fix the size and the shape of a cell which is covered
by straight street segments of different length. The speed along
one segment is supposed to be constant and after each step, the
car has the possibility to change direction and speed (while
an average speed is maintained). The length, the speed and
the change of direction are drawn independently from their
corresponding distributions. The time spend by the car inside
the cell is the sojourn time.
The mobility model in [7] allows us to obtain the sojourn
time distribution for various scenarios in an easy way. We
apply the transformation in Sec. IV on this distribution in order
to obtain the sojourn time distribution for a range of sampling
intervals. These distributions can then be used in order to
compute the entropy rate for various setups, as described
in [1]. As mentioned earlier, the entropy rate is a realistic
estimation of the ultimate performance for our scheme.
In Fig. 3, we show, how the entropy rate behaves for
different scenarios. One can observe that the entropy rate
scales with the cell size. The scaling with the average speed
is a little less straight forward, as the variance of the speed
distribution plays an important role.
VI. RELATED WORK
Limitations of traditional key management based on public
key cryptography spurred work towards alternative symmetric
key establishment methods. The motivation has been to avoid
trusted third parties and public key cryptography (e.g., the
Diffie-Hellman algorithm [8]). Information-theoretic schemes
for key generation based on correlated information have been
the basis: simply put, two legitimate parties observe a source
the adversary cannot, even if it can intercept messages they
exchange [9]. The adversary can be a passive eavesdropper (as
is also the case for the DH protocol); the possibility of key
establishment in the presence of active adversaries is proven
[10].
Many schemes were proposed, leveraging the wireless chan-
nel properties to establish common information the eavesdrop-
per cannot obtain, such as [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19].
Physical layer based schemes may require special hardware
or modification of the wireless transceivers. Even though they
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Figure 2. Grid map (a) without adversary and (b) with adversary, real map scenario (c) without adversary and (d) with adversary.
can offer significant secrecy rates (e.g., 10 bits/s by [20]),
they are limited in local pair-wise operation Without any
transceiver modification, two devices could extract common
information by tracking “one time frames”, i.e., wireless
transmissions received at the first attempt [21]; an adversary
would need to correctly eavesdrop all wireless transmissions
for an extended time period. But none of the above allows
two remote devices that are not connected across the wireless
medium to establish a shared key. This would be the case
for a broad amount of mobile applications, beyond that what
ad hoc 802.11, WSN, or UWB can support. We close this
gap: our scheme is independent of the wireless communication
specifics, leveraging node mobility and traces of connectivity
with wireless infrastructure; and it is deployable in existing
systems with no transceiver modification. For references for
mobility modeling, we refer to [7] and references herein.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Our base position in this paper is that mobility has inherent
randomness that can be exploited to establish common random
bits at low cost. We proposed a protocol that leverages
mobility for secret key generation, and can be deployed in
current cellular systems with minimal modifications of existing
protocols.
Our scheme turns out to be promising: even though it does
not yield high secrecy rates, it operates at low cost. Indeed,
the 15-25 minutes, in the mobility scenarios we investigated,
might at first seem long for the establishment of 128 bit secret
keys. But this is well below the average daily commute time
for many users, and the overall operation requires 3−6 samples
per minute, a low overhead for current mobile devices but
also easy to handle for wireless infrastructures. These almost
“free” random bits can be used to enhance and complement
other security systems, when needed; even in the presence of
a strong adversary.
Finally, mobility can be an incessant source of randomness,
and thus secrecy: users can get essentially “for free” a key
established while on the move. Further, they can have a
continuous accumulation of secret bits over time, and refresh
older (and perhaps compromised) keys, along the lines of
the idea to recover loss of secrecy with newly dynamically
established secrets in [21].
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